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Abstract: 
This paper interrogates the last 20 years in the British experience of using official 
antibody test algorithms to detect the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Case 
definitions of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) cite antibody test 
methodologies licensed since 1985 for screening purposes and derived from laboratory 
identification of HIV. Two common (yet surrogate) methodologies are the enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and the Western blot (WB), both used for 
screening human populations. Test manufacturers publicise the interpretative flexibility 
of these tests, which may produce false or indeterminate results, given laboratory 
identification of HIV is cited as problematic, time-intensive and as using surrogate 
techniques. Globally, public health officials publish differing algorithms for testing of 
human subjects. The paper shows how these algorithms (whilst aiming to balance test 
specificity/sensitivity), are based on perceptions of ‘risk’ of exposure determined during 
pre-test dialogue: how the test subject is positioned as ‘high’/‘low’ risk and within a 
hierarchy of exposure categories. The interpretation of indeterminate results is 
problematic given the possibility of false results, which are ruled out by estimating the 
risk of exposure (‘window period’) and the seroprevalence in the population of the test 
subject. It is argued that during the last 20 years experience with these test algorithms the 
interpretation of the test ‘result’ is not wholly ‘objective’ or laboratory-determined, as it 
relies as much upon the classification of the test subject as being ‘at risk’ during pre-test 
dialogue as it does upon the “epidemo logic” of the ELISA or WB, data which often 
remains ‘black-boxed’ from a critical public scrutiny. Using data from tested subjects and 
published accounts/texts, the paper deconstructs the classification of ‘risk’ embodied by 
official test algorithms and analyses how the ambiguity/uncertainty characteristic of 
antibody-test methodologies have sociological implications for ethical decision-making, 
self-identity and social movements. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the epistemology of diagnosis for the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV). Diagnosis of HIV infection requires two parallel and interlocking 
processes: a biochemical test that takes place in a laboratory using a commercially 
prepared test-kit and a dialogical assessment of ‘risk of exposure’ that takes place in 
the clinic between individuals and health professionals. 
 
In the first part of the paper, connections are critically explored between the 
laboratory identification of HIV and the clinic-based risk assessment and risk 
categorisation of the individual who donates their blood for HIV testing. The aim is to 
analyse how clinical categorisation of risk category may provide the defining context 
for the interpretation of the ‘objective’ signal from the biochemical reaction in the 
laboratory test. Drawing on algorithms published since 1986 by the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, I will analyse whether 
each process - the laboratory-based test versus the dialogical pre-test interview - is of 
equal importance in relation to the diagnostic outcome or whether bias and 
discrimination are implied. 
 
In the second part of the paper, data from tested subjects, published accounts and 
other texts will be used to analyse how the classification of ‘risk’, embodied by 
official HIV test algorithms, demonstrates ambiguity and uncertainty, characteristic of 
all medical screening methodologies. Various sociological implications are explored 
in relation to self-identity, social movements and the critical public engagement with 
AIDS science and technology politically stigmatised by use of the term ‘AIDS 
dissidence’ or ‘AIDS denialist’. I will argue that so-called  ‘AIDS dissidence’ is a 
misnomer used by official health authorities to hide a range of insightful caveats of 
such biotechnologies. Lastly, using the above analyses, I will make some closing 
comments about relationships between differing forms of scientific expertise and the 
need for a greater degree of reflexivity within AIDS science. 
 
By ‘algorithm’ I mean the combined sequence of testing and risk categorisation that 
aims to both identify HIV antibodies in the laboratory from a donor’s blood sample, 
and assess the ‘risk category’ of an individual in a clinic. The latter is derived from 
sexual disclosures and/ or professionals’ deductions over ‘risk’ and the ‘risk category’ 
of the individual for HIV transmission. These processes jointly contribute towards the 
formulation of diagnosis imparted to the individual by a qualified physician
1
. By 
‘black box’, I mean the manner whereby the uncertainties contingencies and 
controversies underpinning these algorithms are collapsed into scientific ‘fact’ 
through expert assimilation
2
. 
 
2.   The Laboratory and the Clinic 
Since 1985, official health authorities, like the UK Communicable Disease 
Surveillance Centre at Colindale, have given leadership in developing test algorithms. 
                                                 
1 In the UK a statutory instrument under the Health and Medicines Act 1998 directs that all HIV testing 
kits supplied in UK must be accompanied by a warning that at least one confirmatory test should be 
undertaken following a positive test result. See, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (1992) Statutory 
Instruments No.460 Public Health, England and Wales. Public Health, Scotland. The HIV Testing Kits 
and Service Regulations 1992. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
2
 After Labour, B (1987) Science In Action. Cambridge Mass. Harvard University Press. Chapter 1 
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Laboratory-based tests, or ‘assays’, in the form of commercially available test-kits 
have been licensed in the UK since 1985 by the UK’s Medical Devices Agency. 
Globally, the two commonly used laboratory tests are the Enzyme-Linked 
Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) and the Western Blot (WB). The ELISA and WB are 
surrogate technologies that aim to detect, not the genome of HIV, but antibodies to 
proteins which epidemiological studies suggest appear in the blood of those with 
AIDS-related illnesses and which may react with an assortment of genetically 
engineered monoclonal proteins in the test-kits thought of as a unique to HIV
3,4,5
. 
EIA/ WB kits are laboratory processes developed by the pharmaceutical industrial 
complex
6
, a form of biotechnology
7,8, and another example of the”…new biological 
techniques that found commercial applications during the 1970s and 1980s”9. The 
ELISA/WB were originally designed to ensure the safety of the blood supply and 
were both developed from the early 1980’s biochemical laboratory procedures used to 
identify HIV (then known as HTLV-III)
10.
 
 
Since the start of the AIDS era, the CDSC (now part of the U.K.’s Health Protection 
Agency) developed algorithms for antibody-tests that advocated using a combination 
of sensitive and specific ELISA’s. Prior to coming onto the market, these test kits 
were then duly evaluated by CDSC scientists.  
                                                 
3
 See, Patton, C. (1990) Inventing AIDS. London: Routledge.pp.32-34 
4
 Unlike WB, ELISA does not separate the proteins considered evidence of an immune response to 
HIV. ELISA yields a yes- or no- answer; WB requires operator interpretation to identify the presence 
of antibodies thought to be specific to HIV proteins. 
 
5
 The sensitivity, specificity and positive predictive values of these tests are calculated based on their 
prior stochastic value- their statistical correlation with illness- using surrogate marker evidence of 
immune suppression like T-cell counts and retroviral; activity like detecting reverse transcriptase the 
enzyme thought characteristic of HIV. 
 
6
 Kenny, M. (1986) Biotechnology. The University-Industrial Complex. New Haven. Yale University 
Press. P.170.n.15. Kennedy analysed the growth /structure of the U.S. biotechnology industry 
describing how the role of university departments of basic/ applied biology helped develop the industry 
and undermined the educational role of the university. 
 
7
   Biotechnology has been defined as “…the collection of industrial processes that involve the use of 
biological systems” Office of Technology Assessment (1981) Impacts Of Applied Genetics. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing office.p.viii. 
 
8
 Biological agents to provide good services may define biotechnology” Bull, A.T., Holt G., Lilly, 
M.D. (1982) Biotechnology: International Trends and Perspective. Paris: OECD.p21. 
 
9
 Kenny, M. (1986) op cit.p.2. 
 
10
 Sinoussi-Barre F. et al (1983) Isolation of a T-Lymphottropic Retrovirus from a patient at Risk for 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. Science 220: 868-871; Popvic M., Sarngadharan MG., Read 
E., & Gallo RC (1984) Detection, Isolation and Continuous Production of Cytopathic Retroviruses 
(HTLV-III) from Patients with Aids and Pre-AIDS. Science 224:497-500. Epstein (1996) op.cit. p. 91-
92:for laboratory controversie over HIV see Connor, S. (1987a) AIDS: mystery of the missing data. 
New Scientist 12 February p19; Connor, S. (1987b) AIDS: Science stands Trial. New Scientist 12 
February p. 49-58; see this chapter page 56 footnote 298 for Papadopulos-Eleopulos et al. 
(1997)(1993b). 
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In one of the earliest British publications on this topic - a book chapter reporting on 
the first UK AIDS Conference in Newcastle 1986 - Philip Mortimer (now a Director 
of the HPA) described the 1986 quality monitoring of the then available commercial 
tests-kits coming onto the market. He talks of that which “…exemplifies what we are 
looking for in an effective test”, namely: 
 
 “(in) Figure 5.11 the blood donor group are all segregated on the 
left, whereas many individuals in the high-risk groups give a strong 
signal in the test, representing positive result, and lie on the right 
side of the histogram. Between these two zones is a wide area in 
which no specimen from any group gives a signal. There is thus very 
good discrimination between a population of positive specimens and 
population made up of negative specimens.” 
 
Later in this 1986 account Mortimer admits that the blood donors in this evaluation 
were “all presumed to be seronegative”. Thus in 1986 what exemplified a good test 
was it’s ability to discern, not just populations of positive versus negative specimens, 
but also positive populations from those presumed to be ‘not at risk. In this 
histogram
11
, false positives are shown, so revealing how the technology at the very 
start of the AIDS era, embodied caveats over false-positivity
12
. 
 
Mortimer then goes on to contradict his statement by saying, “…some sera give 
anomalous and false positive results in many commercial assays. There are several 
reasons for this, but basically they all involve abuse of the specimen” (p.41) referring 
to how storage and handling of the specimen, not the technology itself, produces 
false-positives. He does not describe the reasons, but it was already then known that 
these tests produce ‘biologically false-positive’ and ‘inderminate’ or ‘seroequivocal’ 
results. 
 
Here it is useful to remember that the interpretative flexibility and these tests, for 
although there maybe ‘closure’ and ‘stabilisation’ over the meaning of these tests it 
depends which interests one is examining. U.S. test manufactures have always 
published information on the interpretative flexibility of these tests, which appear less 
than stabilised within the manufacture’s package inserts. For example, in the package 
insert in one of the Abbott Laboratories (1997) test kit, it states  
 
“… ELISA was designed to be extremely sensitive. As a result, 
non-specific reactions may be seen in samples from some people 
who, due to prior pregnancy, blood transfusion, or other 
exposures, have antibodies to the human cells or media in which 
the HIV –1 is grown for manufacture of the ELISA… in most 
settings it is appropriate to investigate repeatably reactive 
specimens by additional more specific or supplemental tests.”13 
                                                 
11
 Mortimer, P. (1987) Investigation: the work of the Laboratories in Proceedings of the AIDS 
Conference 1986 Newcastle upon Tyne, UK (Jones P.ed) Ponteland, Newcastle upon Tyne: Intercept 
(p.41 Figure 5.1). 
12
 Mortimer (1987 p.40). 
13
 Abbott Laboratories (1997) Human Immunodeficiency virus type 1. Immunoassay for the detection of 
antibody to human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) in human serum or plasma. Abbott Park, 
Illinois USA: Abbott Laboratories, Diagnostic Division. P.1 
 Page 6 of 12 
 
6 
Health authorities try to minimise these biases. In England and Wales repeatably 
reactive specimens are re-tested within algorithms combining ELISAs of differing 
specifity and sensitivity. In the USA, ELISAs are confirmed by Western blot tests 
(considered by US authorities as the most specific test for HIV antibodies). Yet 
Organon Teknika Corporation - one manufacturer of U.S. Western blot kits - state in 
their package insert: 
 
“Clinical samples have also described that are reactive in the screening 
assays but do not contain HIV-1 antibody. Some of these samples possess 
antibody to certain class II histo- compatibility antigens that are found in 
some cell lines used to produce the virus. Other persons, who have had 
no known exposure to HIV-1, produce reactive results in the 
screening test for still unknown reasons. Such non-specific results are 
found commonly when screening tests are used in large populations. 
Since the psychosocial and medical implications of a positive antibody test 
may be devastating, it has been recommended that additional testing be 
performed on such samples to validate the presence of antibody specific to 
HIV-1. 
 
Although a positive result may indicate infection the HIV-1 virus, a 
diagnosis of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) can be made 
only if an individual meets the case definition of AIDS established by the 
Centres for Disease Control. 
 
Do not use this kit as the sole basis of diagnosis of HIV-1 infection” 
(Organon Teknika 1997 emphasis added)
14
 
 
This test-kit manufacturer also makes the following statement about the WB test, 
considered the most specific for HIV antibodies: 
 
“Since reactivity of any degree with any virus-specific proteins present 
on the strip results in an Intermediate result, all samples interpreted as 
Intermediate should be repeated using an original specimen. In 
addition, individuals with indeterminate results should be followed for 
up to six months” (Organon Teknika 1997)15 
 
Another caveat is that these test kits don’t use the virus itself as a ‘gold standard’ to 
validate the test
16
, that is, there is “no criterion taken as sufficient evidence that e.g. 
                                                 
14
 (Organon Teknika Corporation (1997) HIV-1 Western Blot Kit. An Enzyme Immunoassay for the 
Detection of Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) in Human Serum or Plasma. 
Durham, North Carolina, USA: Organon Teknika Corporation. Summary p.1, Limitations of the 
Procedure p.12). 
15
 (Organon Teknika Corporation (1997) HIV-1 Western Blot Kit. An Enzyme Immunoassay for the 
Detection of Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) in Human Serum or Plasma. 
Durham, North Carolina, USA: Organon Teknika Corporation. Summary p.1, Limitations of the 
Procedure p.12). 
 
16
 “… a method, procedure or measurement that is widely accepted as being the best available …” Last 
J (ed) (1995) A Dictionary of Epidemiology. Oxford University Press. 3rd Edition. p.70. 
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disease is present and against which other tests can be measured”17. In relation to 
this fact, leading U.S. virologist Blattner states: 
 
“… one difficulty in assessing the specificity and the sensitivity of human 
retrovirus assays [cf. HIV tests] is the absence of a final gold standard. In 
the absence of final gold standards for HIV-1, the true sensitivity and 
specifity for detection of viral antibodies remains imprecise”18. 
 
The following statement, and similar wording, is found in U.S. package inserts for the 
tests published by manufactures: 
 
“At present there is no recognised standard for establishing the presence or 
absence of antibodies to HIV-1 and HIV-2 in human blood”19 
 
The global variation is diagnosis of HIV, lack of any ‘final gold standard’ for test 
authentication and the already well publicised problems over sensitivity/ specificity of 
ELISA/WB, are citied by critical scientists as evidence for alternative technological 
frames of meaning for these technologies as such critics argue that the only gold 
standard for HIV antibody-tests must be formulated in relation to the retrovirus itself 
and not its associated surrogate markers. Thus, the sensitivity 
20
and specificity
21
 of 
such tests are known to be unknown, whilst the isolation of HIV is also citied as 
problematic
22
 , thus Mortimer has stated that current diagnosis of HIV is known to be: 
 
“…based almost entirely on detection of antibodies to HIV, but there can be 
misleading cross-reactions between HIV-1 antigens and antibodies formed 
against other antigens, and these may lead to false-positive reactions. Thus, 
it may be possible to relate an antibody response specifically to HIV-1 
infection”23. 
 
                                                 
17
 Lennox, B. and Lennox, M. (1986) Heinemann Medical Dictionary. London: William Heinemann 
Medical Books. p.232 
18
 Blattner W.A. (1989) retroviruses. In Viral Infections Of Humans (Ed) AS Evans. 3rd edition. 
pp545-592. p551. The forth edition of this text book does not refer to these issues; see Blattner, W., 
O’Brien, T.R. and Mueller, N.E. (1997) Retroviruses – Human Immunodeficiency Virus. In Evans A.S. 
and Kaslow (Eds) Viral Infections in Humans. Epidemiology and Control R.A New York and London: 
Plenum Book Company, pp.713-721. 
19
 Abbott Laboratories (1995, 1998) AxSYM system, B9440 67-68/R6 HIV-1/ HIV2. Human 
Immunodeficiency Viruses (HIV-1/HIV2) Recombinent Antigens and Synthetic Peptides. Copyright 
1995, 1998 Abbott/ AxSYM HIV-2 May 1998; see also exactly the same statement published in the 
U.S. by Abbott Laboratories (1996) Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 HIVAB HIV-1 EIA Abbott 
Laboratories, Diagnostic division Abbott Park IL 60064. 
20
  “How often the teset is positive when you already know what you are testing for is present” Griner, 
P.F., Mayewski, R.J., Mushlin, A. (1981) Selection and interpretation of diagnostic test and procedures. 
Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (2):559-563. 
21
 How often does the test read positive when what you are testing for is known to be absent” Griner et 
al. (1981) op.cit. 
22
 “… the isolation… [of HIV] involvers co-cultivation of host lymphocytes with uninfected (eg. 
Umbilical cord) lymphocytes in the presence of interleukin II. Virus multiplication in culture can be 
detected by the reverse transcription assay..” Mortimer, P. (1988) The AIDS virus and the HIV test. 
Medicine International 56:2334-2339 
23
 Mortimer’s statements also indicate that by term ‘isolation’ is meant ‘identifying’ Reverse 
Transcriptase, an enzyme thought to be characteristic of HIV Mortimer (1988) op.cit. p.2336. 
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In a manufactures package insert for a test kit of the most specific HIV test, the 
Western blot, a fatal caveat is similarly described: 
 
“… persons who have had no known exposure to HIV-1, produce reactive 
results in the screening test for still unknown reasons … it is recommended 
additional testing be performed..”; a positive WB result “may indicate 
with the HIV-1 virus..” (emphasis added)24. 
 
Thus as the package inserts show, abuse of the specimen (as Mortimer put it in 1986), 
is not the only reason for false-positive results; as these are an inherent aspect of the 
screening technology itself, and are associated with how the assays perform in 
relation to the blood samples from high versus low prevalence populations (known as 
the Positive Prediction Value (PPV)) as well as due to cross-reactions caused by 
impurities in the antigen preparation and cross-reactive antibodies in the donor’s 
blood sample
25
. 
 
The lack of official acknowledgement of this information is itself a form of ‘black-
boxing’ because although technical caveats are published by test manufacturers (not 
always in the UK but most especially in the US, perhaps for reasons of litigation), 
such information may not be very accessible to test subjects and/or blood donors.
26
 
 
Returning to the 1986 chapter, Mortimer described the basis of today’s test algorithms 
(in England and Wales): 
 
Table 5.5 shows how the confirmatory procedure operates. A primary test 
is carried out in the hospital laboratory or in a transfusion laboratory, and, 
if a positive result is obtained, our advice is that it should be checked from 
another specimen. We advise both that the test is repeated and also that the 
specimen is referred to one of the confirmatory laboratories. If, on the 
other hand, a negative result is obtained, we ask a number of questions. 
First, is it an expected and entirely negative signal? If so, it seems 
reasonable to report a negative result. If on the other hand, it gives a 
borderline result coming fairly close to the cut-off point in the assay, or if 
the result is not the one that might be expected, the procedure for a 
positive result should be followed.” (Mortimer 1986 p.47, emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
24
 (Organon Teknika Corporation (1997) HIV-1 Western Blot Kit. An Enzyme Immunoassay for the 
Detection of Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) in Human Serum or Plasma. 
Durham, North Carolina, USA: Organon Teknika Corporation. Summary p.1, Limitations of the 
Procedure pp.2,12). 
25
 Barthel, HR, Wallace DJ (1993) False-Positive Human Immunodeficiency Virus Testing in Patients 
with Lupus Erythematosus. Seminars in Arthritis and Rheumatism. 23,1,1-7. 
26
 When this debate over the validity/reliability of HIV test entered a professional journal in 
August/September 1999, Mortimer et al.’s rebuttal chose not to comment on these sorts of disclosures 
by test manufacturers. Two authors wrote an article arguing against the mandatory screening of all 
pregnant women and directly citing at length one HIV test manufacturers’ caveats, see Harrison, R. 
Corbett, K.(1999) Screening of pregnant women for HIV: the case against. The Practising Midwife. 2 
(7) 24-29. Mortimer et al published a reply attempting to discredit the arguments whilst ignoring the 
published information from HIV test manufacturer’s package inserts. See Nicoll et al (1999) Pregnant 
women and testing for HIV. The Practising Midwife 2, 8, 34-37. See also the original authors’ reply. 
Harrison , R. Corbett, K. (1999) Author’s reply. The Practising Midwife. 2 (9) 34-35. 
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Thus although the test is undertaken in a laboratory with its implication of 
‘objectivity’, it is still something that can be ‘expected’ because the sample is 
accompanied by a clinical form declaring the ‘risk group’ of the donor. If the 
laboratory signal is contrary to that which is ‘expected’, the sample should go back 
for re-testing (in the diagram, “the procedure for a positive result”): thus the context 
of the procedure does not appear to be ‘objective’, as implied by the notion of the 
laboratory test, which is contextalized within presumptions over positivity and ‘risk 
catergory’.27 
 
This 1986 test algorithm was later re-worked by Mortimer et al. in a 1992 article from 
the UK Public Health Laboratory services AIDS Diagnosis Working Group. The 
1992 algorithm describes the risk categorisation of the blood donor (‘high/low risk’) 
as well as a balance of the sensitivity and specificity of the available assays. The 
article talks of ruling out false reactions in the initial assay A, using further screening 
assays B, C. It then goes on to discuss the ‘common outcomes’: 
 
“…either the two further assays are both unreactive or (see below) they are 
both reactive. The outcomes A+ B- C- is highly suggestive of false positivity 
in assay A, especially if the reaction in A is unrepeatable. If the optical 
density/cut off ration for the assay is <2 and the individual is not stated on 
the clinician’s request form to be at high risk, it is recommended that a 
negative report be issued without follow up.” (p.61, emphasis added). 
 
The aim is to require blood samples that test positive in England and Wales to be 
retested with the same ELISA methodology to confirm a ‘positive’ a ‘true positive’.28 
There is mention of the ‘high/low risk’ donor below the section of the algorithm 
labelled “OD/CO<2” with two options dependent upon whether the donor is 
considered and/or categorized as ‘low/high risk’. The paper doesn’t talk of the 
‘expected’ result. But if the sample is thought to come from a ‘high risk’ person (even 
though it gives the same optical density signal as a ‘low’ risk sample) it is reported 
“Seek Follow Up Sample”, and accordingly another sample is sought for further 
testing.  
 
My point here is that the same laboratory signal means something different in context 
of the perception of risk posed by the donor of the blood. If it’s thought the sample is 
from a ‘low risk’ person (even with the OD reactivity), the sample exits the algorithm 
with a ‘negative’ laboratory report. If the sample is perceived to come from 
‘individuals within high risk groups’ the laboratory scrutiny is greater, as is the 
suspicion of its positive nature. Unlike the 1986 chapter the discourse of expectation 
                                                 
27
  In this 1986 chapter there is no mention of how ‘risk’ is assessed in the clinic. This omission, and 
the collapse of the notions of ‘risk behaviour’ into ‘risk category’ together with explicit statements on 
‘presumptive risk’ that underpin the algorithm, are all features of this early 1986 discourse. In England 
and Wales this sort of algorithm uses ELISA only, replacing the ELISA plus confirmatory Western blot 
methodology used by health authorities in the United States and Scotland. See, Mortimer, P (1991) The 
fallibility of the HIV Western Blot. Lancet 337 p286-287, Feb 2. 
28
 However, the same test methodologies are used as their own controls and as a means of confirming 
the initial findings with no independent measurement of the specific outcome variable, HIV. Negative 
results are not routinely retested or referred for confirmatory testing, neither in the UK nor in all parts 
of the world further adding to regional variations in diagnosis, see Mortimer, P (1992) Towards error 
free diagnosis. Public Health Laboratory Service Microbiology Digest  9 (2), 61-64.; Papadopulos-
Eleopulos et al (1993) op cit, especially pp.697-698. 
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and presumption is not explicit, but the potential for discrimination between the 
samples is evident within the algorithm, and the text, which makes explicit reference 
to risk category in the clinician’s report: 
 
“If the optical density/cut-off ratio for the assay A is <2 and the individual is 
not stated on the clinicians request from to be at high risk, it is 
recommended that a negative report be issued without follow up.”29 
 
In the 2003 re-worked and published version of the algorithm the above issues are not 
explicitly discussed in the text, or alluded to in the algorithm, but are collapsed into 
the following statement appearing in the text: 
 
“On going audit of the output of any confirmatory algorithm and checking that 
the final result is not at odds with patients’ clinical and behavioural 
characteristics is a key element” (Parry et al 2003, emphasis added)30. 
 
If the donor is perceived as being at ‘high-risk’ there is not only greater scrutiny of 
the sample but a lingering suspicion of positivity so eroding the laboratory-based test 
being purely ‘objective’. Given the constant of exposure category and PPV, how 
assays (tests) perform in differing populations, as Mariah Mensah argues (Mensah 
2000), and I have demonstrated above, exposure category is one constant upon which 
seropositivity is measured
31.  I further argue that the interpretation of the test ‘result’, 
thus the diagnosis, is not wholly ‘objective’ or laboratory-determined, as it relies as 
much upon the classification of the test subject (blood donor) as being ‘at risk’ during 
pre-test dialogue, as it does upon the “epidemo-logic” (Mensah 2000) of the ELISA 
or WB. 
 
 
2. Self-identity, social movements and critical public engagement with AIDS 
science/technology. 
In the second part of the paper, I’m focusing on what it can mean when individuals 
learn of the caveats of these technologies, not from an academic perspective, but from 
an experiential one. For example, whilst interviewing for my PhD these, I [KEVIN] 
recorded the following dialogue with one interviewee (study respondent)[JAMIE] 
about testing: 
 
KEVIN: How could it be that they [blood samples] are labelled like that? Do you  
know that they are? 
 
 JAMIE: Thousands of them. I am certain that they are. 
 
 KEVIN: How are you certain? 
 
 JAMIE: Because I have been in hospitals and I have actually read the clinician’s 
request forms for myself and seen the clinician’s request form. I have also got 
                                                 
29
  Mortimer P (1992) Towards error free diagnosis. Public Health Laboratory Service Microbiology 
Digest 9 (2), 61-64.; 
30
 Parry J, Mortimer P, Perry K et al. (2003) Towards error-free diagnosis: guidelines on laboratory 
practice. Communicable Disease And Public Health 6 (4), 334-350. 
31
 Mensah MN (2000) Screening bodies, assigning meaning. In J Marchessault, K Sawchuk (Eds) Wild 
Science. Reading Feminism, Medicine and the Media. pp139-150. 
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photocopies of the clinician’s request form from various hospitals. So, I know that all 
good specimens are accompanied by information about the individual. This 
information will include whether or not you’ve had a previous positive result, what 
type of person you are, what type of people you have had sex with, whether or not 
you have been at risk of so-called HIV in the last six months. So it includes all that 
information that goes along with your blood sample to the laboratory where the test is 
performed. Now for  me this is not on. The first answer to the question, the first 
answer that you know is that this information, the clinician’s request form which 
accompanies the blood sample to the laboratory is used only for epidemiological 
information and for the public health laboratory to know what the infection rate is like 
in those groups. I think that is bullshit myself because the doctors could report any 
positive results and I think that given the claims made by the doctors about the 
accuracy, the statistically, the reproducibility and the reliability of these antibody 
tests, why would you need to label the blood sample? Why can’t the laboratory 
decide he’s negative and he’s positive, without knowing what type of person that 
the specimen came from ? To me it is absolutely essential that all the blood samples 
are treated objectively and are treated and interpreted in the same way. You know, 
the same results should be interpreted the same way. To me it is essential that, and 
I feel very strongly about it that. Laboratory technicians have to test these blood 
samples completely by. No information about the individual at all should ever be 
sent, under any conditions, to a laboratory. We have to decide whether or not the test 
is supposed to decide, whether or not the test is supposed to tell them whether a 
person is positive, not additional information. If the test can’t tell you that then you 
should find out how often the test can’t tell you that. So really the system at present is 
hiding and masking all of the inconsistencies with the HIV antibody test. I think it is 
the inconsistencies that we should be looking at. I think we could learn a lot from the 
inconsistencies of the antibody test and the other tests that we are currently using. So 
there is that, one reason and I am actually concerned...” (emphasis added)32 
 
 
This sort of interpretation of the testing may be difficult for healthcare professionals 
to appreciate especially if working from a ‘deficit model’ of public understanding of 
science, and if such responses engage with so-called ‘dissenting’ opinions on HIV 
and AIDS. 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
The interpretation of indeterminate results is problematic given the possibility of false 
results, which are ruled out by estimating the risk of exposure (‘window period’) and 
the seroprevalence in the population of the test subject. Based upon the preceding 
analysis, the interpretation of the test ‘result’ is not wholly ‘objective’, or laboratory-
determined, as it relies as much upon the classification of the test subject as being ‘at 
risk’ during pre-test dialogue as it does upon the “epidemo logic” of the ELISA or 
WB. The blood samples that test positive are re-tested (using a freshly drawn sample) 
with the same test methodology and with differing commercially available test-kits, in 
order to confirm a ‘positive’ a 'true positive'. In this way the same test methodologies 
are used as their own controls and as a means of confirming the initial findings. There 
is no independent measurement of the specified outcome variable, HIV. Negative 
results are not routinely re-tested or referred for confirmatory testing in all parts of the 
                                                 
32
 Corbett K (2002) Contesting AIDS/HIV. The Lay Reception of Biomedical Knowledge. Unpublished 
PhD thesis. Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences, London South Bank University p118-119. 
 Page 12 of 12 
 
12 
world. This further adds to regional variation in definitive diagnosis
14
.Globally, 
public health officials publish differing algorithms for testing of human subjects.  
.  
 
 
                                                 
14
 See, Mortimer, P. (1992) Towards error free HIV diagnosis. Public Health Laboratory Service Microbiology 
Digest  9 (2) pp.61-64; Papadopulos-Eleopulos et al. (1993) op.cit  especially pp.697-698. 
